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ABSTRACT
Building on the work of L. Moss on coalgebraic logic, I study in a general setting a class of innitary modal
logics for F -coalgebras, designed to capture simulation and bisimulation. For a notion of coalgebraic simulation,
I use the work of A. Thijs on modelling simulation in terms of relators Γ (extensions of SET -functors along
some family of preoders): simulation is the analogue for relators of the notion of bisimulation for functors. I
prove the logics introduced here can indeed capture coalgebraic simulation and bisimulation. Moreover,
one can characterize any given coalgebra up to simulation (and, in certain conditions, up to bisimulation)
by a single sentence. An interesting feature of this logics is that their notion of truth or satisfaction can be
understood as a simulation relation itself, but with respect to a (relator associated to a) richer functor F ;
moreover, truth is the the largest simulation, i.e. the similarity relation between states of the coalgebra
and elements of the language. This sheds a new perspective on the classical preservation and characterizability
results, and also on logic games. The two kinds of games normally used in logic (\truth games" to dene
the semantics dynamically, and \similarity games" between two structures) are seen to be the same kind of
game at the level of coalgebras: simulation games.
1991 Mathematics Subject Classication: 03G30, 03G99, 03B45, 03B70, 03C05, 18A15
1991 ACM Computing Classication System: F.4.1, F.3.2, I.6.1
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1. Introduction 3
1. Introduction
It has been said that modal logic is the logic of dynamics, as the natural language describing bisimulation-
invariant properties of transition systems. On the other hand, a current trend in the semantics of
programming languages is based on taking coalgebras as standard models for dynamical systems, gen-
eralizing (various notions of) transition systems. A natural problem that arises from this work is
to generalize modal logics to coalgebraic logics for various functors. There are at least two dierent
directions to explore: rst, extending modal logic concepts, methods and ideas to the coalgebraic
context; second, applying coalgebraic methods and concepts back to the study of modal logics and of
logic in general. Some work along the rst line has been done by L. Moss, M. Rossiger, A. Kurz and
B. Jacobs, but there still remains a whole area of open problems concerning nding the coalgebraic
analogues of classical constructions in model theory of modal logic. The second line of research has
not even been touched until now, as far as I know.
Coalgebras are generalizations of transition systems, which can be seen to be dual to algebras, from
a category-theoretical point of view. See [Rut] and [JacRut] for a general introduction to the theory of
coalgebras. Informally, one could say that algebraic operations are ways to build up complex objects
from simpler ones, in a \bottom-up" fashion, while coalgebraic operations are ways to analyse, unfold
or observe the dynamical behaviour of objects, in a \top-down" manner. They have been used to
model computational features of innite objects (streams, automata, processes, innite data types,
probabilistic transition systems etc.), in the semantics of concurent and object-oriented languages and
(more recently) in understanding the logico-algebraical-computational aspects of some basic proof
methods used in clasical analysis. In universal algebra one is primarily concerned with initial algebras,
which contain all the objects that can be built recursively using some given operations, and which give
us recursion and induction principles. Dually, in the theory of coalgebras, the important objects are
the nal coalgebras, which describe all possible behaviours and give us corecursion and coinduction
principles. Coinduction is usually formulated in terms of bisimulation, a notion originally coming
from concurent programming languages (but studied earlier by set-theorists under dierent names)
and later seen to be the categorial dual of the notion of congruence. It has been rst dened for
transition systems and non-wellfounded sets, and generalized to coalgebras by Aczel and Mendler
[AM]. It later turned out this denition has an equivalent, but much more transparent and natural,
formulation in terms of relators (i.e. functors in the category Rel, having sets as objects and binary
relations as arrows). Moreover, if this notion of relator is weakened in a natural way, the same
denition gives a concept of coalgebraic simulation. The relation of similarity is dened as the largest
simulation relation between two coalgebras. This is a weaker, \asymmetric" version of bisimilarity,
proposed by A. Thijs [Thijs], as a generalization of the standard notions of simulation for transition
systems and for deterministic automata.
This paper builds on, generalizes and simplies the work done by Larry Moss on coalgebraic logics.
He introduced, for every suitable functor F on sets, an innitary language that generalizes a fragment
of standard modal logic, strong enough to characterize coalgebras up to F-bisimilarity (generalizing the
Hennessey-Milner property). He uses the standard Aczel-Milner denition of coalgebraic bisimulation.
We are using the relator denition, which we nd to be simpler, more natural and easier to use
in proofs. In fact, we use Thijs’s above-mentioned generalization of this notion, which allows uso
introduce, for every suitable relator Γ on sets, an innitary \modal" logic that captures coalgebraic Γ-
simulation (and bisimulation, as a particular case). Among these logics, there are many natural logics
for various types of transition systems (including probabilistic transition systems), as well as their
existential and universal sufragments. We prove analogues of classical modal characterization-up-to-
(bi)simulation (Scott and Hennessey-Milner properties), denability, preservation and interpolation
theorems for these logics. We obtain in particular (simpler proofs for) all the results of Larry Moss.
We also study the associated logical-semantical (pebble) games, under the name of simulation games.
These generalize the \pebble" versions of Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games for modal logics, designed to de-
cide whether two structures are \similar" (i.e. related by a simulation/bisimulation). An interesting
4observation is that the truth-condition for the universal modality 2 resembles the denition of simu-
lation (and the condition for 3 - the one of converse simulation). This resemblance is the basis of my
current work. The language can be naturally endowed with a coalgebraic structure, but with respect
to a more complex functor. Truth (the satisfaction relation) for this logic can be seen as the largest
simulation relation between the model (the given coalgebra) and the language. So one could say that,
for coalgebraic logic, truth is similarity.
This leads to a better understanding of some of the proofs of classical results, which become more
transparent in this general setting: for instance, preservation of existential sentences under embeddings
(simulations) becomes a simple consequence of the transitivity of similarity. As a project for future
work, we plan to pursue in general this coinductive denition of truth, which can be seen as a dual
of Tarski’s inductive denition. Such a notion can be meaningfully applied to self-referential, xed-
point or, more generally, non-inductive languages. These usually come with an underlying coalgebra
structure, in the same way that classical inductive languages come with an algebraic (Lindenbaum)
structure. Also, one can see some non-compositional logical semantics, namely some of the so-called
game semantics (used by some authors to dene truth for both classical logic and for more problematic
fragments of natural languages), as instances of this coinductive notion. This is natural: games in
general are coinductive objects. But what is interesting is that, for coalgebraic logics, the truth-dening
games can be understood as simulation games.
The coalgebraic perspective might hence give a unied view on these various uses of games in
logic: both the analogues of pebble (Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse) games and the \truth-dening" games for
coalgebras turned out to be simulation (and bisimulation) games. So the pebble games can be seen
(at least in the case of coalgebras) to be games of the same type as the ones used in game semantics.
2. Coalgebras, Relators and Simulation
In the following, Set will be the category of sets and functions. For convenience, we also move one-step
beyond sets and consider the category SET of classes and set-continuous functions (i.e. functions f
between classes s.t. f(C) =
Sff(c) : c  C and C is a setg). (This can be avoided, but it is only
necessary in order to talk about \the nal coalgebra" and \the largest xed-point" of some functors
like the powerset P .) Similarly, Rel (and REL) is the category of having as objects sets (and classes,
respectively), and as arrows relations (and set-continuous relations between classes, respectively, i.e.
relations R s.t. ARB i there exist some sets a  A; b  B with aRb). We identify relations and
functions with their graphs, writing sometimes afb or (a; b) 2 f for f(a) = b, and similarly (a; b) 2 R
for aRb. We denote by relational composition, dened by A(RR0)B i there exists C s.t. ARCR0B,
and (because of identication of functions with their graphs) we use the same relational composition
for functions (instead of the usual functional composition, which goes the other way around).
Let F be a functor on SET . The following denitions are taken from [Moss]:
Denition 2.1 F is set-based if for all classes C and all a 2 F (C), there exists some set C0  C and
some a0 2 F (C0) s.t. a = (Fi)a0, where i is the inclusion of C0 in C. F is said to be standard if the
image of every inclusion i;A ,! B is also an inclusion Fi : FA ,! FB.
Every standard functor is monotone: if A  B then FA  FB. Every monotone and set-based
operator F has a least xed point F? and a largest xed point F ?. All functors considered in this
paper are assumed to be standard and set-based. All the natural functors on SET are like this
(including powerset, identity, constant functors and all the functors obtained from these by applying
compositions F G, products F G, sums F +G and exponentials FC with constant exponent-set).
Denition 2.2 A coalgebra for an endofunctor F : SET ! SET is a pair (A;) s.t. A is a set or a
class, and  : A! FA is a map called the coalgebra map. An algebra is the dual notion: a pair (A;)
with  : FA! A.
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Observe that any xed point of F , considered with its identity map, is both an F -algebra and an
F -coalgebra.
Examples of coalgebras are: Kripke structures, transition systems, automata, streams etc. In par-
ticular, a Kripke structure (A;!) (where ! is a binary relation on A, called the accessibility re-
lation) can be understood as a coalgebra for the powerset-functor (A;), with  : A ! P(A),
(a) = fb 2 A : a ! bg. Similarly, a nondeterminist transition system with action labels in a
set Act is a coalgebra for the functor X 7! P(ActX).
Denition 2.3 A coalgebraic morphism between F -coalgebras (A;), (B; ) is a function f : A −! B
such that   (Ff) = f  . (Usually, this is stated the other way around, but remember we decided
to use relational composition even for functions, where this is the dual of functional composition.)
The category SETF of F -coalgebras has F -coalgebras as objects and coalgebraic morphisms as
arrows.
Denition 2.4 (Aczel-Mendler) A coalgebraic bisimulation between F -coalgebras (A;); (B; ) is an
F -coalgebra (R; γ), s.t.:
R is a binary relation R  AB
the projections R1 : R ! A,R2 ! B are (coalgebraic) morphisms, i.e.: R1   = γ  (FR1 ) and
γ  (FR2 ) = R2  . (Remember that we use relational composition!)
It can be shown that the relevant part of a bisimulation is the underlying binary relation R. In
the particular case of Kripke structures (or transition systems) this is equivalent to the standard
denition: R  AB is a bisimulation if
aRb =) [8a0  A a9b0  B b a0Rb0 & 8b0  B b 9a0  a a0Rb0]:
As mentioned in the Introduction, an alternative denition of the same notion can be given in terms
of relators.
Denition 2.5 A strong relator Γ is a functor in the category REL; i.e. Γ maps classes (sets) to
classes (sets) and binary relations to binary relations s.t.:
1. if R A B then ΓR  ΓA ΓB
2. Γ(R R0) = ΓR  ΓR0
3. Γ(A) = ΓA, where A is the identity relation on A.
The notion of a weak relator is obtained by dropping condition 3, and requiring only 1 and 2.
A weak relator Γ is said to extend a functor F if we have:
 ΓA = FA for every set A
 Γ(f)  Ff for every function f (identied with its graph-relation)
It is easy to see that a (weak) relator Γ can extend a functor only if we have (at least) half of the
\strong-relator"-condition, i.e. Γ(A)  A for every A (-this is because A is a function on
A). Also, one can show that a strong relator extending F will have the stronger property that:
Γ(f) = Ff for every function f . Also, one can check that a strong relator has the following
properties:
4. If R  R0 then ΓR  ΓR0
65. For R  AB; f : A! A0; g : B ! B0, we have
(Γf  Γg)[ΓR]  Γ((f  g)[R]):
(Here f [A] =: ff(a) : a 2 Ag is the image of A through f .)
This can be made into a denition (due to A. Thijs), that captures (the only) properties of strong
relators which will be relevant in this paper:
A weak relator is monotonic if it satises conditions 4 and 5 (besides conditions 1 and 2, which
dene weak relators).
All relators used in this paper are monotonic. From now on we drop the adjectives \weak" and
\monotonic" and we shall speak of F -relators to designate monotonic weak relators extending some
functor F .
There is a theorem by Carboni, Kelly and Wood that says a functor F on SET can be extended
to a strong relator i F has a certain categorial property (preservation of weak pullbacks). More
importantly for our purposes, they also prove that:
Proposition 2.6 If F has an extension to a strong relator ΓF then this extension is unique, and is
given by:
ΓFR =: (FR2 )  (FR1 )−1;
where R is an arbitrary relation R  AB, with projections R1 : R! A; R2 : R! B.
In this case, Thijs proved that ΓF is the minimal F -relator:
Proposition 2.7 If F has an extension ΓF then ΓFR  ΓR, for every F -relator Γ.
Given an F -relator Γ we dene, for each class (set) A:
.Γ;A =: Γ(A) (the image of the identity):
Then Thijs has proved that:
 .Γ;A is always a preorder on A
 if A  B; x; x0 2 FA then we have: x .Γ;A x0 i x .Γ;B x0. This is a \mutual consistency"
requirement which ensures this preorder is a \universal" relation, which does not actually depend
on the underlying set (similarly to the fact that identity  is also such a \universal" relation).
This justies dropping the subscript A and introducing the notation
.Γ =: Γ():
 Γ is uniquely determined by (F and) the preorder it induces; more concretely,
ΓR = .Γ  (ΓFR)  .Γ;
where ΓF is the (unique) (strong) minimal F -relator.
He also gave necessary and sucient conditions in which a given \universal preorder" (i.e. family
of preorders which are mutually consistent as above) induces an F -relator. (The condition is the
generalization of the above-mentioned categorial condition of \preservation of weak pullbacks").
So a relator can be uniquely determined by specifying the pair of the underlying functor F and the
underlying preorder .Γ. We shall do this by identifying the relator with this pair:
Γ = (F; .Γ):
Examples of relators extending functors: Let F = P be the powerset functor (dened by
FA = PA, and for functions f : A ! B, Ff : FA ! FB is given by (Ff)(A0) =: f [A0] = ff(a0) :
a0 2 A0g for every A0 2 PA). Then:
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1. the minimal (strong) P-relator ΓP is given by dening, for classes A;B and relations R  AB,
the relation ΓPR  PAPB by:
A0(ΓPR)B0 i 8a0 2 A9b0 2 Ba0Rb0 & 8b0 2 B9a0 2 Aa0Rb0
(for all A0  A;B0  B). One can easily recognize the well-known back-and-forth conditions
present in the standard notion of bisimulation for transition systems. Of course, the underlying
preorder is (as for any strong relator) the identity .
2. another P-relator Γ = (P ;) is obtained by taking set-inclusion  as its underlying preorder:
.Γ =: : This arrives to taking only the \forth" condition above:
A0(ΓR)B0 i 8a0 2 A9b0 2 Ba0Rb0:
3. yet another P-relator Γ is obtained by taking the converse inclusion  as the underlying
preorder. This arrives to taking only the \back" condition in the above denition of ΓP .
In general for an F -relator Γ, one can dene the transposed F -relator Γ, given by: ΓR =:
(Γ(R)), where in general R is the converse of the relation R. For example, Γ = Γ:
Denition 2.8 (A. Thijs) Given an F -relator Γ, a Γ-simulation between two F -coalgebras (A;); (B; )
is a relation R  AB s.t., for all a 2 A; b 2 B:
if aRb then (a)(ΓR)(b):
Dene the relation of Γ-similarity Γ between the two coalgebras as the greatest Γ-simulation between
them. For a 2 A; b 2 B;, we write R : a !Γ b if R is some Γ-simulation relating a with b. A Γ-
simulation equivalence is a relation R such that both R and R are Γ-simulations (or equivalently, R is
both a Γ-simulation and Γ-simulation). We write a ’Γ b if a and b are related by some Γ-simulation
equivalence.
Then we have the following:
 Γ-similarity is the converse of Γ-similarity.
 The relation of Γ-similarity satises:
a Γ b () (a)(Γ Γ)(b):
 ΓF -similarity is equivalent to F -bisimilarity (in the Aczel-Mendler sense). This is the alternative
denition we announced: bisimilarity is just similarity with respect to the strong relator.
 F -bisimilarity implies Γ-equivalence, which in its turn implies both Γ-similarity and Γ-similarity
(or converse similarity). In general, all the converses fail.
 If .Γ is a partial order (i.e. is antisymmetric) then Γ-equivalence is equivalent to F -bsimulation.
 More generally, the following generalization of Aczel-Mendler’s denition
R  AB is a Γ-simulation between (A;) and (B; ) i there exists an F -coalgebra
(R; γ), such that the projections R1 ; R2 satisfy: R1  .Γ γ (FR1 ) and γ (FR2 ) .Γ
R2  .
8Examples: In the particular case of Kripke structures (or, more generally, non-deterministic tran-
sition systems), ΓP -similarity coincides of course with bisimulation. But Γ-similarity coincides with
the standard notion of simulation (i.e. \half" of a bisimulation: if aRb then 8a0  a9b0  b a0Rb0).
One can also see that the usual notion of simulation for deterministic automata can be otained in this
frame b y taking an appropriate preorder.
Operations with relators:
(Preordered) Sum. Given relators Γ = (F; .);Γ0 = (F 0; .0), their (preordered) sum Γ + Γ0 =
(F + F 0; .0 + .00) is obtained by taking the coproduct (sum) F + F 0 of two functors (which maps sets
S to the disjoint sum FS+F 0S and functions f to the direct sum f + g) together with the preordered
sum of the two preorders .+ .0, where, for every S:
i(x)(.+ .0)i(y) i x . y , for x; y 2 FS
i0(x)(.+ .0)i0(y) i x .0 y , for x; y 2 F 0S
i(x)(.+ .0)i0(y) i x 2 FS; y 2 F 0S
(where i : FS ! FS + F 0S, i0 : F 0S ! FS + F 0S are the canonical injections).
(Preordered) Product. Given relators Γ = (F; .);Γ0 = (F 0; .0), their (preordered) product
Γ Γ0 = (F = F 0; . .0) is obtained by taking the product F  F 0 of two functors (which maps sets
S to the Cartesian product FS  F 0S and functions f to Ff  F 0f) together with the product of the
two preorders:
(x; y)(. .0)(x0; y0) i x . y and x0 . y0:
Natural Relator Transformations:
Given two relators Γ = (F; .);Γ0 = (F 0; .0), a natural relator transformation  : Γ! Γ0 is a natural
transformation  : F ! F 0 (i.e. a family fS : FS ! F 0S : S 2 Setg s.t. for every function f : S ! T
we have S  F 0f = Ff  T , using relational composition notation), which is preorder-invariant, in
the sense that:
x . y i S(x) .0 S(y);
for all sets S and all x; y 2 FS.
It is easy to see every natural relator transformation is \relator-invariant", in the following sense:
x(ΓR)y i S(x)(Γ0R)S(y);
for all sets relations R  S  T between sets S and T , and all x 2 FS; y 2 FT .
It is known that, given a natural transformation  : F ! F 0, any F -coalgebra (A;) can be seen
as an F 0-coalgebra by composing  with A. We restate in our relational notation the following
Theorem 2.9 (J. Rutten)
A natural transformation  : F ! F 0 between functors F and F 0 : SEt ! Set induces a functor
between the categories of F -coalgebras and F 0-coalgebras (−) : SetF ! SetF 0 , which maps (A;) to
(A;A) and any coalgebraic F -morphism f : (A;)! (B; ) to the F 0-morphism f : (A;A)!
(B;   B). Moreover, this functor preserves bisimulations.
We can now stregthen this to the following
Theorem 2.10 If  from the above theorem is a natural relator transformation between the functors
Γ and Γ0 then the induced functor is simulation-invariant, i.e. we have:
R : a !Γ b i R : a !Γ0 b;
for all F -coalgebras A;B, all relations R  A B and all a 2 A; b 2 B. Hence we also have: a ’Γ b
i a ’Γ0 b.
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Examples
1. Add-Bottom-transformation 1 + (−):
Let 1 = f?g be a singleton set and let (by sistematic ambiguity) 1 : Set! Set be the constant
functor given by: 1(A) =: 1; 1(f) =: 1 = (?; ?). Consider on it the obvious relator 1, given
by taking identity as the preorder. For a given relator Γ, consider now the (preordered) sum
1 + Γ. This new relator is basically obtained by adding a \bottom" to the preorder .Γ. The
canonical inclusion (embedding) A : FA ! 1 + FA of each FA into 1 + FA gives a natural
relator transformation  : Γ! 1 + Γ. We denote this transformation by 1 + (−). By the above
theorem, it induces a simulation-invariant functor (which is actually an embedding) from SetF
to Set1+F .
2. Sum-to-Product-transformation:
There is a standard natural embedding from a sum-functor
P
i2I Fi to a product-functor.
Namely, take some privileged element ?, put as above 1 = f?g, and then dene  : Pi2I Fi !Q
i2I(1 + Fi) in the following way: for a set A, dene A :
P
i2I FiA!
Q
i2I(1 + FiA), by
A(ini(x))(j) =: ?, if i 6= j; x 2 Fi;
A(ini(x))(i) =: in2x, if i = j; x 2 Fi;
where ini is the canonical embedding of FiA into
P
i2I FiA and in2 is the canonical embedding
of FiA into 1 + FiA.
If we consider now a family of relators fΓi = (Fi; .i) : i 2 Ig, The above-dened natural
transformation can be easily seen to be a natural relator transformation (embedding) fromP
i2I Γi in to
Q
i2I(1 + FiA).
Again, by the above theorem, this gives us a natural simulation-invariant functor from the
category of
P
i2I Γi-coalgebras to
Q
i2I(1 + FiA)-coalgebras.
3. Identity-to-Powerset:
There exists a natural transformation  : I ! P (where I is the identity functor and P is
powerset), given by the singleton map: A : I(A) = A ! PA, A(a) =: fag. This can be
easily seen to be a natural relator transformation from the identity relator I to any of the
following: strong powerset relator ΓP , inclusion-set-relator Γ, converse-inclusion relator Γ.
From these, we shall later consider the second, which we call the identity-to-powerset-inclusion
transformation.
3. Some Classical Modal Logic
I review here some standard results in classical modal logic, taking the opportunity to also introduce
some less-standard notation that would later make more transparent the connection with coalgebraic
logic. For simplicity, I only treat unimodal logic with Kripke structures as models.
A Kripke structure is a pair (A;!) consisting of a set (or class) A and a binary relation ! on
A. The (negation-free) innitary modal language Lmod is dened as the least class of sentences such
that: if ’ is a sentence in Lmod and  is a set of sentences in Lmod, then
V
;
W
;2’;3’ are also
sentences of Lmod. For simplicity, we do not consider any atomic sentences (but the \true" sentence
> and the \false" sentence" ? are in the language, since > = V ; and ? = W ;). We shall not need
negation, so we do not consider it. For sets of sentences  we introduce the following notations:
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21 =: 2
_

31 =:
^
f3’ : ’ 2 g
4 =: 2 ^3:
For each list Op  fV;W;2;3;21;31g of logical or modal operators, we denote by LmodOp the
subfragment of Lmod which can be built using only operators in Op. Sentences of LmodV;W;2 are called
universal sentences, while the sentences of LmodV;W;3 are called existential.
The semantics is the usual one for logical connectives, while for modalities: a j= 2’ i a j= ’ for
every a0  a, and a j= 3’ i a j= ’ for some a0  a. Observe that our newly introduced innitary
modalities behave very similarly respectively to a simulation, a dual simulation and a bisimulation:
a j= 21 i 8a0  a 9’ 2  s.t. a0 j= ’
a j= 31 i 8’ 2 9a0  a s.t. a0 j= ’
a j= 4 i a j= 21 and a j= 31
(This observation will be used later.)
Here is a list of classical results:
1. Two (states in two) Kripke structures are (related by a) bisimilar(ity) i they satisfy the same
innitary modal sentences, which happens i they satisdfy the same LmodV;4. Similarity for Kripke
frames is equivalent to preservation of existential sentences and also equivalent to preservation
of LmodV
21 . A dual statement holds for dual (converse) simulations.
2. Every state of a Kripke structure K can be characterized up to bisimilarity by a sentence in
LmodV;4. Similar statements hold for similarity (converse similarity) with respect to LmodV21 .
3. A modal sentence is preserved under similarity (converse similarity) i it is equivalent to an
existential (universal) formula.
Our purpose is to generalize these facts to arbitrary coalgebras.
4. Coalgebraic Γ-Logic
Let F be some standard, set-based endofunctor on SET , having an extension to a relator Γ.
Syntax. The language of our coalgebraic logic is dened as the least class L such that:
if   L is set of formulas in L and X 2 F, then V;W;2X;3X are formulas of X .
Alternatively, one could have dened L as the least xed-point of the operator P + P + F + F , and
denote by
V
the injection i1 : PL ! L of the rst component of the sum into L, by
W
the injection
i2 of the second component, by 2 the injection i3 of FL into L etc. We do not introduce negation, as
it is not needed for our purposes. We could of course introduce it (with its classical semantics), but
one should observe that even so, the modalities are not interdenable in the usual way via negation:
even if : makes sense for  2 L, there is nothing like :X for X 2 FL.
One should think of our coalgebraic operators 2 and 3 as generalizations of the innitary modal
operators 21, 31 (but not of the unary modalities 2 and 3). We also introduce the notation
4X =: 2X ^3X:
As in the modal case, we also consider sublanguages of the form LOp, for some set of operators, and in
particular the universal fragment LVW2 (built without using 3) and its dual, the existential fragment
LVW3, built similarly without using 2.
Semantics: Given a F -coalgebra (A;), we dene the relation of satisfaction j= A  L as the
unique relation satisfying
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 the usual inductive clauses for V and W
 a j= 2X i (a)(Γ j=)X
 dually, a j= 3X i (a)(Γ j=)X:
The correctness of the denition is ensured by the fact L is a least xed point, which ensures the
uniqueness of j= with these properties. In other words, this is indeed an inductive denition of truth.
On the other hasnd, it can be also understood as a co-inductive denition: it is easy to see that the
we have the following
Proposition 4.1 (\Coinductive" characterization of satisfaction). The above relation of sat-
isfaction can be characterized as the greatest relation between A and L satisfying:
1. if a j= V then a j= ’ for every ’ 2 
2. if a j= W then a j= ’ for some ’ 2 
3. if a j= 2X then (a)(Γ j=)X
4. if a j= 3X then (a)(Γ j=)X:
Similarly, one can easily check that there are such coinductive characterizations of satisfaction for
the natural sublanguages of L, among of which we mention the following
Satisfaction for LV2 can be characterized coinductively as the greatest relation between
A and L satisfying conditions 1. and 3. from the above characterization of satisfaction.
Examples There are a lot of examples: for each pair of a \natural" functor F and an F -relator, one
obtains a \natural" logic falling under our general denition. I only point here that, if we take F = P
(powerset) and Γ = Γ, we obtain exactly the classical modal logic L modVW2131 , which is essentially
equivalent in expressive power to the full modal logic L mod. On the other hand, if we take the strong
P-relator ΓP , then all our coalgebraic modalities collapse to the same thing:
3ΓP = 2ΓP = 4ΓP = 4:
More generally, 2;3;4 collapse to the same thing for every strong relator. The logic obtained in this
particular case of strong relators is exactly Larry Moss’s coalgebraic logic.
To distinguish the semantics of our logic from the one of the logic of L. Moss, we use the term
\Γ-language" when the semantics is given as above, in terms of some arbitrary F -relator Γ, and we
reserve the term \F -language" for the ΓF -language.
Next, we generalize the above-mentioned classical results. For this, we introduce the following
notation:
Denition 4.2 For coalgebras (A;), (B; ), states a 2 A; b 2 B and some fragment L0  L of our
logic, we write a L0 b i every sentence of L0 is true at b only if it is true at a:
a L0 b i 8’ 2 L0(b j= ’) a j= ’):
This relation is the converse of L0-preservation.
Theorem 4.3 (Logical Characterization of Similarity): Given coalgebras (A;); (B; ), the
following are equivalent, for all a 2 A; b 2 B:
(i). a Γ b
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(ii). a LV2 b
(iii). b LV3 a, i.e. all formulas in LV3 are preserved when passing from a to b.
To summarize it in words: \ Similarity coincides with preservation of (the truth of) Γ-existential
sentences" (and with the converse-preservation of universal sentences).
Proof: By taking the direct sum A+B of the two coalgebras, we can safely asumme that a; b live
in the same coalgebra A = B; = . (Observe that, for any pair of states, none of the relations j=,
Γ, L changes: the relations are \locally the same". We shall only prove the equivalence between
(i) and (ii); the others are similar (and they can also be obtained from this by duality).
Claim 1 : (i)) (ii); that is, LV2-formulas are preserved by similarity: if a Γ b and b j= ’ 2 LV2
then a j= ’.
Proof of claim: The claim is equivalent to saying that Γ  j=j=. But to show this we need
(by the above coinductive charaterization of j=LV2) to prove that Γ  j= satises conditions
1. and 3. above (when we replace j= with Γ  j=).
Condition 1. is trivial to check, so let us check 2. Suppose that we have a(Γ  j=)2X . Then
there exists some c 2 A s.t. a Γ c, c j= 2X . But the similarity relation Γ is a simulation, so we
must have (a)(Γ Γ)(c). On the other hand, by truth-condition for 2, we have (c)(Γ j=)X .
By composition, we have that: ((a); (c)) 2 (Γ Γ Γ j=) = Γ(Γ  j=). But this means that
Γ  j= satises condition 2.
Claim 2 There exists a set of formulas   LV2 such that for all a; b 2 A, we have: a  b i
a LV2 b.
Proof of claim: This is an easy cardinality argument. For each pair (a; b) 2 A2 s.t. a 6LV2 b
choose some ’ to witness this. Take  to be the set of all such ’’s (which is not bigger than
A2) and check it works.
Claim 3 There exists some relation R  LV2 A such that: j=A R =LV2 .
Proof of Claim: For each a 2 A, put a =:
Vf’ 2  : a j= ’g. Then take R = −1 (the inverse
relation of the function  : A! L) and check the claim, using the Claim 2 about .
Claim 4 LV2 is a Γ-simulation. (From this, it follows directly that (ii) ! (i), since by denition
Γ is the largest Γ-bisimulation; so after this we are done.)
Proof of claim: Suppose we have a LV2 b. By Claim3, we have A  LV2 = j=A R, so
(since Γ is a relator) we have ((b); (b)) 2 FA = F (A)  Γ(A)  Γ(j=A R) = (Γ j=A
)  (ΓR). So there exists some X 2 FL s. t. (b)(Γ j=A)X and X(ΓR)(b); but then (by
truth-dention of 2) we have b j= 2X . We supposed that a LV2 b, so we conclude that also
a j= 2X . Hence (again by truth-denition) (a)(Γ j=)X ; but remember that X(ΓR)(b), hence
by composition we conclude that ((a); (b)) 2 (Γ j=A)  (ΓR) = Γ(j=A R) = Γ(L) (since by
Claim 3, j=A R =LV2 ). Hence (a)(Γ LV2)(b). So LV2 is a Γ-simulation.

Corollary 4.4 (Moss’s Logical Characterization of Bisimilarity): Bisimilarity coincides with
preservation of (=equivalence with respect to) the F - language LV4:
a  b i a LV4 b
Proof: Apply the preceding theorem to the strong relator ΓF . 
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Corollary 4.5 Γ-equivalence coincides with equivalence with respect to L: In the same conditions as
above, a and b are Γ-equivalent i they satisfy the same sentences of our logic.
Proof: As a consequence of the above Theorem, elementary equivalence with respect to our logic
is both a simulation and a converse simulation, hence it is a Γ-equivalence. 
Corollary 4.6 (Second Characterization of Bisimulation): If .Γ is a partial order then bisim-
ilarity is captured by L-equivalence.
Our theorem above implies that a state in a coalgebra can be characterized-up-to-similarity by its
theory in LV3 (i.e. by the class of all sentences in this language which are satised by the state). As
in the classical case of transition systems, this result can be stregthened to obtain characterization of
a state by a single sentences in the language:
Theorem 4.7 (Characterization-up-to-Similarity): For every coalgebra (A;) and state a 2 A,
there exists some sentence a 2 LV3 such that, for every coalgebra (B; b)) and state b 2 B, we have:
b j=B a i a Γ b:
In other words, Γ-similarity is characterizable by a sentence in the Γ-language LV3. Similarly, Γ-
similarity (i.e. the converse of Γ-similarity) is characterizable by a sentence in LV2.
From this we obtain
Corollary 4.8 (L. Moss’s Characterization-up-to-bisimulation) For every coalgebra (A;)
and state a 2 A, there exists some \characteristic sentence" a 2 LV4 in the F -language, such that,
for every coalgebra (B; b)) and state b 2 B, we have:
b j=B a i there exists an F -bisimulation relating a and b:
Corollary 4.9 Every state in a coalgebra can be characterized up to Γ-equivalence by a sentence in
our Γ-language L. In case that .Γ is a partial order , then bisimilarity is captured by L-equivalence.
5. Simulation Games and Truth-as-Simulation
Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games, pebbleg games for nite-variable logics and the simulation/bisimulation
game for modal logic are various examples of (not unrelated) games used to \compare two structures"
and see how much \alike" are they. I am describing below a concrete example from the folklore, the
Simulation Game for Kripke structures.
Example:
The \Simulation game" can be played in general on transition systems, but to keep it simple we
shall restrict our attention to (unimodal) Kripke structures. Two structures (A;!A); (B;!B). There
are two playes, Y (yes) and N (no), and a play goes on like that: player N starts by chosing some
a0 2 A, and player Y choose some b0 2 B. Then N has to choose some a1  A a0, to which player
Y answers with some b1  A0 b0; then player N chooses again some a2  A a1, to which Y responds
with some b2  A0 b1, etc. If, at anytime, some player cannot his move, he loses. If the play goes on
forever, Player Y winns.
One can easily see that:
Proposition 5.1 a and b are related by a simulation on Kripke structures i, given the initial position
(a0; b0) = (a; b), Player Y has a winning strategy in the simulation game.
There is also version for bisimulation, in which, when he has to choose, player N is allowed to choose
from either of the two structures some successor of either his last choice or his opponent’s last choice.
We can immediately generalize these games to coalgebras:
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Coalgebraic Simulation Game
For a given F -relator, the \Γ-Simulation Game" is played on two F -coalgebras (A;), (B; ).
Player N chooses some pair (a0; b0) 2 A B (claiming they are not related by a simulation). Player
Y has to choose some binary relation R0 s.t. ((a0); (b0)) 2 ΓR0. Then player N chooses some pair
(a1; b1) 2 R0, to which player Y answers with some R1  A  B s.t. ((a1); (b1)) 2 ΓR1, etc. The
winning rules are as in the previous game.
Proposition 5.2 a Γ b i, given the initial choices (a0; b0) = (a; b), player Y has some winning
strategy in the Γ-simulation game.
One can of course adjust the game to check for Γ-equivalence instead of simulation, by allowing the
rst player to play not just Γ-moves, but also Γ-moves. Games like this have a natural dynamic and
coinductive flavor: it is clear that the \moves" of the players follow the \next-steps" of the coalgebras
trying to match them in a (bi)simulation. Such semantic games have been used for avariety of purposes.
An interesting observation is that, in the Γ-semantics, the denition of truth for 2 reproduces the
\simulation" clause (and the one for 3 the one for \converse simulation"). Moreover, a close look at
the proofs of the above-mentioned characterization theorems shows that this coinductive simulation-
like character of truth is actually the basis of (the non-trivial part) of these proofs. Both for getting
a better understanding of these proofs and for the sake of a general, logico-philosophical interest, it
is tempting to pursue this analogy and try to use the insights from the theory of processes and other
dynamical systems in a study of the apparently-static-unshakable concept of \logical truth". First,
we have to extend this observation to the whole Γ-language, treat language itself as a coalgebra and
show truth is a simulation with respect to the underlying functor.
First, let us try to do this in a simple, classical case: Kripke structures. Given a Kripke structure
(A;!), we can expand the structure by adding the idle transitions, transforming A into a transition
system with two kind of actions: !, corresponding to the old transitions, and the \idle transition"
!0= A (the identity relation on A). Then observe that innitary conjunction is an \innitary
diamond" operator (in the sense dened above) for the idle transition, while innitary disjunction is
a \box" for it, because of our earlier observation about their \simulation"-like character:
a j= 21 i 8a0  a9’ 2  s.t.a0 j= ’
a j= 31 i 8’ 2 9a0  a s.t. a0 j= ’:
This means that truth behaves like a \local simulation" for 2 and
W
and a local converse-simulation
for 3 and
V
.
Now, to generalize this idea to coalgebras, we need to endow every F -coalgebra with more structure
in order to match the language. We rst need rst to add the \idle" transitions to our given F -
coalgebra:
From F -coalgebras to I  F -coalgebras. Any F -coalgebra (A;) can be considered as an
I  F -coalgebra (A;A  ), where I is the identity functor, by putting
 (a) =: (a; (a)):
This correspondence is a natural way to \add" the iddle transitions (given by the identity map) to
our coalgebra. It is easy to see that this correspondence is a functor  (−) from SetF to SetIF ,
and that moroever it is bisimulation-invariant: R is an F -bisimulation between two F -coalgebras i
it is a I  F -bisimulation between their images under the above correspondence.
The identity functor has a natural extension to an \identity relator" I, given by taking identity as
our preorder: I = (I;). If one considers now some extension of F to a relator Γ = (F; .), this induces
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a natural extension of IF to the relator IΓ (where the product of relators has been dened above
using the product-preorder). Then the above correspondence can be seen to be simulation-invariant:
R : a !Γ b i R : a !IΓ b;
for all F -coalgebras A;B, all relations R  AB and all a 2 A; b 2 B.
Language as coalgebra: Next, we endow our language L with a coalgebra map, in a natural
way. Our language was dened as the least xed-point of the functor P + P + F + F . Given our
assumptions about F , one can easily see that, if we endow L with the identity map  : L ! L, we
obtain an initial algebra for the same functor, which is also a coalgebra for the (same) functor.
Similarly, the restricted language L^2 can be considered as an P + F -coalgebra (with the identity
map).
Unifying the types of our coalgebras:
We have on one hand our models (F -coalgebras, which by the above correspondence can be also
considered as) I  F -coalgebras, and on the other hand the languages L and L^2, endowed with the
above coalgebra structures. The problem for dening a simulation between them is that the languages
are coalgebras of dierent types than the models. We shall solve this by raising the types of both to
obtain a common functor.
We rst do it for the fragment L^2, which (by our characterization theorem above) is the natural
language for simulation.
First, we transform the language from a sum-coalgebra to a product coalgebra, using the canonical
Sum-to-Product natural relator transformation (dened in Section 2). As a result, the language L^2
becomes a (1 + P) (1 + F )-coalgebra, with map γ given by:
γ(
^
) =: (; ?)
γ(2X) =: (?;X)
Now, on the side of the models: we have already reconsidered our models as I  F -coalgebras. We
would like to have them as (1 + P)  (1 + F )-coalgebras. But there exists a natural transformation
from IF to (1 +P) (1 +F ). This can be obtained by considering the natural identity-to-powerset
transformation mentioned in the second section (call it T ), the natural embedding in2 of F into 1+F ,
and then taking
(T  in2) in2
as our transformation.
By our theorem in Section 2, this induces a simulation-invariant functor from I  F -coalgebras
(having I  Γ as relator) to (1 +P) (1 + F )-coalgebras (having (1 + Γ) (1 + Γ) as relator). And
by composing this with the above simulation-preserving functor  (−) : SetF ! I  F , we obtain
a simulation-invariant functor fromF -coalgebras to (1 + P) (1 + F )-coalgebras.
This functor can be described directly, by putting H : SetF ! (1+P) (1+F ), H(A;) =: (A;),
where:
(a) =: (fag; (a)):
So our common relator for both L^2 and A as coalgebras is Γ =: (1+Γ)(1+Γ). As a consequence
of the fact that all these functors are simulation-invariant, we obtain that
Lemma 5.3 For all F -coalgebras (A;); (B; ), we have:
(A;) Γ (B; ) i (A;) Γ (B; ):
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Proposition 5.4 (\Truth is similarity") Our (earlier dened) notion of truth or satisfaction re-
lation between F -coalgebras (A;) and the Γ-language L^2 coincides with the relation of Γ-similarity
(i.e. the greatest Γ-simulation) between (A;) and (L^2; γ).
Note: The same move can be applied to the whole language L. Of course, the relevant notion of
simulation is the simulation-equivalence. By raising the type, we consider both L and A as coalgebras
for the functor PP (1+F ) (1+F ), on which we consider the relator given by the product of the
following preorders: 1+ ; 1+ ; 1 + .Γ; 1 + /Γ. Then we can see that truth for L, as dened above,
coincides with similarity with respect to this relator (which also coincides with simulation-equivalence
with respect to the previous relator Γ).
6. Conclusions and Future Work
As the last theorem shows, in coalgebraic logic truth is similarity, the largest simulation relation, but
only if we consider a richer functor: Γ-satisfaction for F -coalgebras is the Γ-similarity between the
F -coalgebra structure of these F -coalgebras and the Γ-language L. Nevertheless, truth is a simulation,
and the \local simulation" induced by it on the F -structure is responsinble for some of its nice logical
properties.
We would like to pursue this idea in more generality in further work. We list some reasons for which
we think this might be interesting;
1. One can obtain simpler, more iluminating proofs of some of the classical results. An example
is the fact that preservation of certain formulas under certain relations becomes obvious, by
the transitivity of similarity (i.e. the fact that a composition of simulations is a simulation).
Another example is our proof of the \characterization result" that generalizes Larry Moss’s (and
Hennessey-Milner’s) results, which is much more simple and direct than the previous ones.
2. Possible generalizations to other languages: For instance, self-referential languages (like -
calculus, other xed-point logic, languages based on \systems of language equations" (e.g. the
ones used by J. Barwise in Situation Theory) come naturally equiped with a coalgebra structure.
Also, there exist logical languages, closer to natural language, and for which the intended seman-
tics is not \compositional", so truth cannot be built algebraically bootom-up. There are many
proposals in this respect, many of them with a \dynamic" or game-theoretical flavor, stated in
terms of possibilities of action, ways to \use" the information sentence to update your informa-
tion or to change the environment. But these notions are very close to the dynamical notions
that coalgebras have been \invented" for. The hope would be to capture some of these in the
general frame of coalgebras and coinduction, as models for dynamics. After all, the fundamen-
tal insight behind these attempts seems to be the same as the dynamic-coinductive semantics:
instead of starting at the bottom and working your way up until you reach or construct the
truth of the formula, you just start with the formula (and a dynamic model) and you \follow"
the formula, going wherever it leads and \doing" what it tells you do, and keep doing it unless
you reach a \failure" state (proving the formula false).
3. One could generalize the above-mentioned game-semantics and unify it with the \pebble games".
Indeed, in the coalgebraic logic, satisfaction (truth) and similitude-of-structure (simulation or
bisimulation) turned out to be the kind of thing. Accordingly, one can immediately give an
(equivalent) game semantics to our logic: just use the above \simulation game", applying it
to the coalgebra structure of the language, on one side. In this sense, one can understand our
\truth-as-simulation" proposal as a more abstract way to introduce a game semantics. But it
is also interesting in that it reveals the deep relation between these two main logical uses of
games: \truth-games" (Hintikka-style, say) on one side, \similitude" or equivalence games on
the other (pebble games etc.) At the level of coalgebras, these two notions of logical games can
be recognized as being the same kind of games: simulation games.
17
References
1. Bart Jacobs, J. Rutten, A tutorial on (co)algebras and (co)induction, EATCS Bulletin, 62:222-259,
1997.
2. Larry Moss, Coalgebraic Logic, 1997, to appear.
3. J. Rutten, Relators and Metric Bisimulations, vol.11 CMCS’98 of ENTCS 11(1998), pp. 257-263.
4. J. Rutten, Universal Coalgebra: a Theory of Systems, to appear in TCS.
5. Albert Thijs, Simulation and Fixpoint Semantics, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Groningen,
1996.
